A recent article in the New York Times by Adam Nossiter describes the new realities in post-coup Niger. Apparently, the Chinese state is the main foreign power that continues doing business with the Nigerien state following the recent coup that successfully removed Mamadou Tandja from power. Tandja is now kept, under house arrest, in a villa close to the capital of the country, Niamey.

Thought the article takes a rather dramatic tone indirectly suggesting that China’s surge into Niger is rather dangerous for the country, it is a useful tool for understanding the larger picture of China in Africa.

The fact that the Chinese are doing business as usual is in accordance with its principle of non-interference and with its overall strategy of working with any regime be that a legitimate one or a highly contested one. The article in question notes that China has become more active in the country, but does not directly highlight the reason why this is the case. Basically, the Chinese state’s investments have increased because of the vacuum of power and business in the country. China, a newcomer in West Africa, has gone to great lengths to secure access to the local markets and resources. For much of the last ten years, in Niger, it was trailing France, its former colonial power. But when President Sarkozy joined the European Union’s decision to halt the foreign aid to Niger because of the dictatorial tendency of the then president of the country who dissolved the parliament and the highest courts, the Chinese state saw a great opportunity to step in and increase its leverage and engagement in the country.

China’s desire to work with any government, especially in this case, is not uninterested. Obviously, the Chinese state and its ambassador to Niger are directly interested in making sure that the previous contracts and agreements are also respected. And they cannot achieve that goal without the approval of the new junta who is running the country. In this case, the Chinese only option is pouring in even more money in Niger in hopes that it will eventually pay off. At the same time, whether it pays off in actual profits or not is less important to China. After all, the Chinese state can lose hundreds of millions in one country simply because Chinese state companies register significant profits in other African countries. This means that the Chinese state is not always going after the actual financial profit as its long-term strategy includes other goals – political, economic and social.

Sanoussi Tambari Jackou, the senior member of Niger’s Parliament made an interesting statement which I would also like to analyze briefly.  He said that “it’s the West that threw Tandja into the arms of the Chinese.” The basic idea is that since the foreign aid from the West was suspended until elections are held, the new state could only reach out to the Chinese state. In addition, as it is clear from his statement, Sanoussi Tambari Jackou sees this as a bad thing. Yet this is one common misconception for both Africans and Westerners alike. No matter where the aid is coming from, those who approve these aid programs have their own agendas which are extractive in one way or another. At the end of the day, I highly doubt there are any significant differences between France and China insofar as their extractive and economic policies are concerned. Nor do I see exactly why they should be different. After all, European or Chinese companies invest because they are looking for profits not because they care deeply for the African people in question.

To me, China’s new engagement in Niger is neither surprising nor necessarily a worrying factor per se. I have argued this in the past, China in Africa is what you make of it. Those in power should be very careful on how much they rely on the Chinese state but they shouldn’t dismiss this partnership – not that they actually have the freedom to do it. The Nigerien junta is currently in a similar position as many other African statesmen: they have to choose between various choices which can go against the national interests of the country. There is currently no offer out there, or institution, that the Nigerien state can fully trust so they simply have to make the best of what they have. In other words, as Romanian like to say, you work with what you are given.

Lastly, given China’s consistent surge into Africa, I wish to suggest that its aggressive policy can only be matched by a reformed system of aid allocation. Lamenting about China in Africa will ultimately amount to nothing productive. What the leaders and the stakeholders behind the major international organizations should seriously consider is reforming institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or other UN agencies in ways that will make UN offers more attractive alternatives. Currently, the Chinese state is the one that provides immediate assistance to the new regimes emerging in Africa and elsewhere. Condemning it will not really make a difference; coming up with attractive alternatives to China’s engagement in Africa, might just do it. I strongly believe that only a meaningful and genuine reform of the United Nations can actually serve as an alternative to the Chinese state. In the process, what is most important to notice is that both the Chinese and the Westerners can reform their institutions and Africa-related policies by competition against each other in Africa and elsewhere.

What’s my conclusion?

China + Niger = Love (for now)

China+ the West = Competition

Competition + Reforms = better choices for Niger and other African countries.

PS: To read more from an actual expert on China-Africa relations, please visit Deborah Brautigam’s blog “China in Africa the Real Story“. You should also read her fascinating book called The Dragon’s Gift: The Read Story of China in Africa.